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THE CHAIN AND UNITY OF TITLE THEORIES FOR
DELINEATING RIPARIAN LAND: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CASE PRECEDENT*
DONALD R. LEvi AND KENNETH C. SCHNEEBERGERtj
I. INTRODUCTION
Either the chain or unity of title theories is employed in
most states following the riparian rights system (in whole or in
part) to determine the boundaries of the area on which riparian
water may legally be used. The purpose of this essay is to (1)
investigate the nature and scope of these two theories, (2) analyze
the economic implications inherent in their application, and (3)
suggest a simple model to assist in analyzing the comparative eco-
nomics of using water from alternative stream and underground
sources.
II. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHAIN AND UNITY
OF TITLE THEORIES
The riparian system of water rights is in force in most of the
eastern states (that is, the 31 states extending easternly from and
including the tier states along the west bank of the Mississippi
River). These states are usually classified as "humid" for water
law purposes and the systems that prevail in them are considered
to presuppose a relatively abundant supply.
The riparian rights system also coexists in those states fol-
lowing the California Doctrine of water law. In general, it ap-
plies in the "border" states existing between the humid and arid
areas of the United States. In its simplest form, the California
Doctrine applies prior appropriation rules (first in time, first in
right) to public waters and the riparian rights system to private
sources.
Riparianism provides that each proprietor of land abutting
on a watercourse has a coequal right to the "reasonable use" of its
water on riparian land. Consequently, the definition of "riparian
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land" is of critical importance in determining where riparian
water can be legally used in riparian rights states and, to the
extent they follow the riparian rights system, to those following
the California Doctrine.
Two major doctrines have emerged defining how much
land abutting a stream is to be considered riparian. These are
the "chain of title" and "unity of title" theories.
It should be noted that those states cited, infra, (Washing-
ton, Texas, California) as following the chain (or source) of
title theory are all among those generally classified as following
the California Doctrine of water law. Thus, given the different
uses, supplies, and climates of these states as compared to those
applying the riparian rights system to all the riparian sources,
it is questionable whether the chain of title test is or will be a
part of the riparian doctrine of any eastern state.
On the other hand, cases can be found in both California
Doctrine (Oregon)' and riparian rights jurisdictions (Penn-
sylvania)2 which advocate the unity of title test as being appro-
priate for delineating the boundaries of riparian land. Both
theories will be discussed in turn.
Chain of Title
The chain of title3 theory essentially states that water may be
used only on land which has been held as a single tract through-
out its historical chain of title. This means that any severed, non-
abutting portions of the original tract forever lose their riparian
character even though subsequently brought back into common
ownership, unless a contrary intention is manifested. This theory
was accepted in Washington, 4 Texas, and California. Under
this theory, as transfers occur over time, the amount of riparian
land is constantly diminishing and the total amount of riparian
land cannot be enlarged by the purchase of contiguous back
tracts.
1. Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855 (1901).
2. Slack v. Marsh, 11 Phila. 543 (Pa. C.P. 1875).
3. Sometimes, perhaps erroneously, this is characterized as being synonomous with
the source of title theory.
4. Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 P. 804 (1928).
5. Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733 (1905).
6. Boehmer v. Big Rock Irrigation Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908 (1897); Lux v.
Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
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There is a line of cases which appears to deviate from the
chain of title test. It is difficult to determine if they constitute
a test which coexists with the chain of title test, is a corollary
of it, or exists in lieu of the chain of title test. This test was stated
in the case of Watkins Land Co. v. Clements.7
In that case the defendant irrigated land which was outside
the watershed of the stream. Land was also irrigated which was
within the watershed but had been acquired by a separate govern-
ment patent than the watercourse-abutting tract. In determining
what lands were riparian, the court said that (1) land acquired
in a single transaction was riparian and (2) land outside the
watershed of a stream is not riparian to it. But the court went
on to say that conditions might exist which would permit use
of water outside the watershed (for example, if the water sup-
ply is abundant and the drainage area small). Thus, irrigation
of non-riparian lana may be permissible if other riparians are
not affected by it. Unlike the Anaheim case," in Watkins9 the
court did not consider the use of the water on non-riparian land
a trespass but only an unreasonable use in the arid regions of Texas.
This case referred to, but did not elaborate on, the "single
transaction test" other than to say that a parcel of land which
is regarded as one tract should be regarded as riparian. In nor-
mal terms and in common usage this would mean forty acre plots
(the amount initially obtained from the government).
Perhaps a clearer statement of this portion of the rule was
made in Crawford Co. v. Hathaway.10 There the court said
riparian land cannot exceed the area required by a single govern-
ment purchase, and in view of the fact that the policy of the
government is to dispose of forty acre tracts, then riparian land
should not exceed forty acres.
7. 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733 (1905).
8. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 32, 88 P. 978 (1907), where an
injunction was granted against an upper riparian using water from a river to irrigate
in the watershed of a creek, with the land on which such use was occurring having been
served and reacquired by the owner of the abutting tract. The court found that the
defendants were not riparian owners with respect to the land being irrigated, but rather
were trespassers on the plaintiff's property rights.
9. Here, some land being irrigated was outside the watershed while other land
was within it, though acquired by a different government patent than the abutting tract.
10. 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
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However, Crawford was overruled in a case11 accepting the
chain of title test. Thus, Texas now stands alone on the source
of title test, if it in fact is different than the chain of title test.12
Unity of Title
The unity of title theory provides that any tracts contiguous
to the abutting tract are riparian if held in common ownership
regardless of when the various tracts were acquired. This implies
that a riparian proprietor may increase the amount of his legally
classified riparian land by purchasing contiguous back tracts
within the watershed. Consequently, given the trend to larger
farms and landholdings, the unity of title theory implies a con-
tinually expanding quantity of riparian land. Perhaps this theory
is best set forth by the Oregon court in Jones v. Conn:"3
It would seem, therefore, that any person owning land which abuts upon or
through which a natural stream of water flows is a riparian proprietor, entitled to
the rights of such, without regard to the extent of his land, or from whom or
when he acquired his title. The fact that he may have procured the particular
tract washed by the stream at one time, and subsequently purchased land adjoin-
ing it, will not make him any less a riparian proprietor, nor should it alone
be a valid objection to his using the water on the land last acquired. The only
thing necessary to entitle him to the right of a riparian proprietor is to show
that the body of land owned by him borders upon a stream.14
The unity of title theory has found favor in other juris-
dictions. The only eastern states to define riparian land have fol-
lowed it. 5 Kansas also appears to have adopted this theory, 1
and the unity of title test was adopted by the American Law In-
stitute as the restatement view.' 7 It should be noted though, that
while the definition of the extent of riparian land frequently is
not clear in eastern states, administrators of diversion permit sys-
tems' in some of these states have relied on the "source or chain
of tide" theory.' 9
11. Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 758 (1966).
12. See 27 MIcH. L. Rav. 479 (1929), citing I KINNEY ON IRRIGATIoN 464, indicating
the two tests are not synonomous.
13. 39 Ore. 80, 64 P. 855 (1901).
14. Id. at 39-40, 64 P. at 858.
15. Slack v. Marsh, 11 Phila. 543 (Pa. C.P. 1875).
16. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905).
17. 4 REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 848, comment c.
18. The "administrators" referred to here are the personnel of those state admin-
istrative agencies charged with the responsibility of administering the permit systems
adopted and patterned somewhat after western state legislation. The State of Iowa is an
example.
19. See 1959 Wis. L. Rav. 279, 293.
DELINEATING RIPARIAN LAND
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
It can readily be shown that water law should be permissive
with respect to providing the opportunity for social welfare max-
imization.?' If we assume for the moment that irrigation is the
only feasible use which can be made from a given riparian water
source, this essentially argues that the theory utilized to delineate
where riparian water can be used should permit irrigation water
to be allocated to the most marginally responsive land.2 1 That is,
law should permit successive quantities of water to be allocated to
the tract where they will yield the largest possible increase in
production.m
Neither the chain nor unity of title theories can be expected
to encompass the most marginally productive land in all cases.
Therefore, regardless of which theory a given state employs, the
law is preventing water from being used in its most beneficial use
(in the sense of social welfare maximization).
The rational water user will seek to minimize his irrigation
water acquisition costs. If he can irrigate from a riparian source
at a lower cost than would be incurred by tapping underground
supplies, if he is not constrained by legal source limitations on
use, ceteris paribus, he would choose to irrigate from the stream.
Obviously, relative costs of ground and stream irrigation will
vary, depending upon method of irrigation, distance from stream,
distance to underground acquifer and the type of sub-surface
material through which one must drill in order to reach a
sufficient supply. However, for any given tract the comparative
costs of underground and stream irrigation can be calculated.
Economically speaking it is preferable that water law permit
one to select the least cost method of irrigation, ceteris paribus.
20. See generally, e.g., D.R. Levi, Highest and Best Use: An Economic Goal for
Water Law, 34 Mo. L. Ray. 164 (1969), in which the simple theoretical framework is
developed to justify this assertion.
21. In its simplest form, this implies that each successive quantity of water should
be allocated to the use in which it is most productive. For example, assume the alloca-
tion decision is between farmers A and B, and that the irrigation response character-
istics of the soil on their farms are such that, respectively, yield increases expected from
an acre-inch of water would be 18 and 7 bushels of corn. Thus, if only one acre-inch
is available for irrigation, the basic marginal allocation principle is that it should be
allocated to farmer A in order to maximize the productivity from the given quantity of
water. See Levi, supra note 17, for a more complete description of this "marginality"
principle.
22. Or, more properly, greatest possible increase in net profit.
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This can be computed with the following formula. It is designed
to determine the "break-even point" ("break-even distance"), or
the point at which the costs from underground and riparian
sources are exactly equal:
PPU+ (PxF,) (DXC,)r-CPPU,-± (P,\<F,)
where
PPU - cost of pump and power unit
r - riparian
w - well
P, - cost of pipe, per foot
F, total feet of pipe required
D,-- well depth, in feet
Cf - cost of drilling well, per foot
C= cost of packing the well and installing a screen.
Though it may at first appear formidable to one not ac-
customed to working with break-even analysis, in reality the in-
terpretation of the above formula is quite simple. First, the for-
mula assumes that the same water application system (in this case,
either gated pipe or a "traveling gun' 2") will be used regard-
less of whether a stream or well is selected as the water source.
Since the cost of the application system will therefore be the
same in any case, it may be omitted in our computation of com-
parative costs.
The left side of this equation will compute the cost of instal-
ling an irrigation system from a stream. Its basic components are
(1) a pump and power unit, and (2) the pipe required to carry
the water from the pumps to the point at which the application
system referred to above is located.
The right side of the equation similarly computes the cost
of installing the items necessary to carry water from the under-
ground source to the application system. In addition to the pipe,
pump and power unit, it includes all drilling, packing and well
preparation costs.
When the two sides of the equation are exactly equal, this
says that the cost of installing stream and well irrigation equip-
ment is precisely the same. If one side is smaller, this indicates it
represents the least cost manner of supplying irrigation water to
this particular point (tract).
23. A self-propelled sprinkling mechanism.
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The following examples, illustrative of Missouri River Basin
conditions, show how the general formula can be used to compare
stream and well investment costs.
Example 1: A 40 acre field to be irrigated is adjacent
to a stream with a water flow adequate to permit irriga-
tion. The alternatives are to use a 100 foot well located
in the center of the field or to pump water from the
stream to this central distribution point (660 feet from
the stream). An adequate well can be drilled for $15
per foot; packing the well will cost an additional $200.
The same size pump and power unit, costing $3,700
will be required regardless of whether we pump from the
well or the stream. Pipe costs $1.40 per foot. Using the
formula, the computations would be as follows:
[PPU + (PXFp)] = [ (DIXC)-C+PPU-+ (PXF ,)]
[3700+ (1.40X 1320)]=[ (100X 15)+200+3700 + (1.40
X 660)] $5548<$6324
In this example, the delivery system that uses the stream as
the water source is less expensive than the well. The stream has
a net investment advantage of $776 ($6,324-$5,548). A riparian
landowner would prefer the stream over the well under the stated
conditions.
Example 2: An 80 acre field to be irrigated is located
one-half mile from the stream. A well can be drilled at
the edge of the field closest to the river. Well depth is
200 feet and drilling costs are $15 per foot. Well packing
costs are $200. A slightly larger pump ($4,100 vs. $3,700)
is required to pump the water from the stream. Pipe
costs $1.40 per foot. Using the formula, we can again
compare the two alternatives:
[4100+ (1.40X2640)]=[ (200X 15)+200+3700+ (1.40
X 1320)] [4100+3696]=[3000+200+3700+1848]
$7796<$8748
In this example, the stream has a net investment cost ad-
vantage of $952 ($8,748-$7,796). However, an irrigator could not
acquire the right to use riparian water under the chain of title
theory where his point of use is one-half mile from the stream,
because of this theory's previously noted forty acre (one-fourth
mile) maximum. And, of course, a non-riparian would likewise
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be denied the right to irrigate this tract from the stream even
under the more liberal definition of riparian land associated with
the unity of title theory.
Any time the irrigation point of distribution is between the
river and the "break-even distance" (that is, the distance from the
stream at which irrigation investment costs for well and stream
are precisely equal), arguably such point should be within the
area legally classified as riparian if economically optimal results
are to occur. Admittedly, the ceteris paribus (other things equal)
assumption being employed is of critical importance to this asser-
tion, and the relaxation of same may yield some circumstances
under which such assertion appears somewhat specious.
To illustrate, it may be argued that many streams do not
contain sufficient flow to permit diversion for irrigation, once a
particular community's24 higher valued uses such as household
and municipal, stock watering, recreation and fish and wildlife
uses are satisfied. While this may well be true, it is of little con-
solation to irrigators and other water users legally classified as
non-riparians for whom a nearby stream carrying water not
needed for higher valued uses is the least cost source.
Under some circumstances where the least cost source is a
stream, the point of distribution under consideration may lie out-
side the watershed. Again, from the standpoint of economics, this
fact alone is not logically sufficient to conclude that all such uses
should be prohibited.
However, the logic of permitting riparian sources to be tapped
for use on non-riparian land can be criticized when the proposed
location is such that, to the extent a use is non-consumptive,
geological features prevent the same riparian source from being
recharged. That is, downstream users may be partially dependent
on this recharge, and the value of same to them may be capital-
ized into the value of their land. Consequently, one can argue
that restrictions on the location of riparian water use should not
be eliminated unless downstream riparians are compensated for
the capitalized value of recharge.
One further observation is offered with respect to the eco-
nomic "illogic" associated with the current rule of limiting
24. Here the term community is used in a broad sense to include that sector of
society residing in or with direct interest in the enumerated uses throughout the water-
shed.
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riparian water use to riparian land. It is not unusual to find areas
near our larger streams in which a nearby well is recharged al-
most solely from the stream. Thus, even a non-riparian may be
able to legally affect the stream flow level by drilling a well. If
this be so, it seems rather ironic that this same user would be
denied the right to take water directly from the stream.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Laws should not be so structured as to prevent that alloca-
tion of water from which society receives the greatest possible
benefit. While case precedent developing the chain and unity of
title theories has served to give warnings of limitations on use,
and thereby permit planning to avoid potential legal disputes, it
probably has not facilitated economically optimal results in all
cases.
These two theories constitute arbitrary allocation mechan-
isms which do not recognize the economic realities of water use
and investment decisions, and give no assurance that society will
have the opportunity to realize maximum benefit from its water
resources. In order to facilitate economically optimal results, it is
submitted that these legal constraints should be eliminated,2 and
that users be permitted to transport water to any location which
rational economic use dictates.
The potential usefulness of the simple break-even analysis
presented in this discussion lies in helping delineate the areas of
rational economic use from alternative sources.2" Obviously, any
legal scheme to establish the permissible locations of use of
riparian water will possess a degree of arbitrariness. Certainly, the
magnitude of the area of economically rational (least cost)
riparian water use may vary significantly, depending on a variety
of hydrological and geological factors.
Recognition of this variation could be incorporated into
water law by allowing the area of permissible riparian water
use to vary among watersheds. While still imperfect, the use of
simple analyses (such as that described in this essay) to establish
boundaries for these areas makes more economic sense than the
precedent-based theories in current use.
25. Compensating those beneficiaries of recharge who have capitalized same into
their land values.
26. While presented in the context of irrigation, the basic analytical framework can
be altered to apply to other kinds of uses (e.g., recreational, industrial, etc.).

